Abstract-We consider both finite-horizon and infinitehorizon versions of a dynamic game with N selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov processes, conditioned on their current actions. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In dynamic games with asymmetric information, a widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) which consists of a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and belief consistency. In general, there does not exist a universal algorithm that decouples the interdependence of strategies and beliefs over time in calculating PBE. In this paper, for the finite-horizon game with independent types, we develop a two-step backward-forward recursive algorithm that sequentially decomposes the problem (w.r.t. time) to obtain a subset of PBEs, which we refer to as structured Bayesian perfect equilibria (SPBE). In such equilibria, a player's strategy depends on his/her history only through a common public belief and its current private type. The backward recursive part of this algorithm defines an equilibrium generating function. Each period in the backward recursion involves solving a fixed-point equation on the space of probability simplexes for every possible belief on types. Using this function, equilibrium strategies and beliefs are generated through a forward recursion. We then extend this methodology to the infinite-horizon model, where we propose a time-invariant single-shot fixed-point equation, which in conjunction with a forward recursive step, generates the SPBE. Sufficient conditions for the existence of SPBE are provided. With our proposed method, we find equilibria that exhibit signaling behavior. This is illustrated with the help of a concrete public goods example.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
EVERAL practical applications involve dynamic interaction of strategic decision makers with private and public observations. Such applications include repeated online advertisement auctions, wireless resource sharing, and energy markets. In repeated online advertisement auctions, advertisers place bids for locations on a website to sell a product. These bids are calculated based on the value of that product, which is privately observed by the advertiser and past actions of other advertisers, which are observed publicly. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize its reward, which for an auction depends on the actions taken by others. In wireless resource sharing, players are allocated channels that interfere with each other. Each player privately observes its channel gain and takes an action, which can be the choice of modulation or coding scheme and also the transmission power. The reward it receives depends on the rate the player gets, which is a function of each player's channel gain and other players' actions (through the signalto-interference ratio). Finally, in an energy market, different suppliers bid their estimated power outputs to an independent system operator that formulates the market mechanism to determine the prices assessed to the different suppliers. Each supplier wants to maximize his/her return, which depends on its cost of production of energy, which is its private information, and the market-determined prices which depend on all the bids.
Dynamical systems with strategic players are modeled as dynamic stochastic games, introduced by Shapley [1] . Discretetime dynamic games with Markovian structure have been studied extensively to model many practical applications, in engineering as well as economics literature [2] , [3] . In dynamic games with perfect and symmetric information, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is an appropriate equilibrium concept and there exists a backward recursive algorithm to find all the SPEs of these games (refer to [4] - [6] for a more elaborate discussion). Maskin and Tirole [7] introduced the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for dynamic games with symmetric information, where equilibrium strategies are dependent on some payoff relevant Markovian state of the system, rather than on the entire history. This is a refinement of the SPE. Some prominent examples of the application of MPE include [8] - [10] . Ericson and Pakes [8] modeled industry dynamics for firms' entry, exit, and investment participation, through a dynamic game with symmetric information, computed MPE, and proved ergodicity of the equilibrium process. Bergemann and Välimäki [9] studied a learning process in a dynamic oligopoly with strategic sellers and a single buyer, allowing for price competition among sellers. They studied MPE of the game and its convergence 0018-9286 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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behavior. Acemoglu and Robinson [10] developed a theory of political transitions in a country by modeling it as a repeated game between the elites and the poor, and study its MPE. In dynamic games with asymmetric information, and more generally in multiplayer, dynamic decision problems (cooperative or noncooperative) with asymmetric information, there is a signaling phenomenon that can occur, where a player's action reveals part of its private information to other players, which in turn affects their future payoff (see [11] for a survey of signaling models). 1 In one of the first works demonstrating signaling, a two-stage dynamic game was considered by Spence [15] , where a worker signals his/her abilities to a potential employer using the level of education as a signal. Since then, this phenomenon has been shown in many settings, e.g., warranty as a signal for better quality of a product, in [16] ; larger deductible or partial insurance as a signal for better health of a person, in [17] and [18] ; and in evolutionary game theory, extra-large antlers by a deer to signal fitness to a potential mate, in [19] .
For dynamic games with asymmetric information, where players' observations belong to different information sets, in order to calculate expected future rewards players need to form a belief on the observations of other players (where players need not have consistent beliefs). As a result, SPE or MPE, 2 are not appropriate equilibrium concepts for such settings. There are several notions of equilibrium for such games, such as perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), sequential equilibrium, and trembling hand equilibrium [4] , [5] . Each of these equilibrium notions consist of an assessment, i.e., a strategy and a belief profile for the entire time horizon. The equilibrium strategies are optimal given the equilibrium beliefs and the equilibrium beliefs are derived from the equilibrium strategy profile using Bayes' rule (whenever possible), with some equilibrium concepts requiring further refinements. Thus, there is a cyclical requirement of beliefs being consistent with strategies, which are in turn optimal given the beliefs, and finding such equilibria can be thought of as being equivalent to solving a fixed point equation in the space of strategy and belief profiles over the entire time horizon. Furthermore, these strategies and beliefs are functions of histories and thus their domain grows exponentially in time, which makes the problem computationally intractable. To date, there is no universal algorithm that provides simplification by decomposing the aforementioned fixed-point equation for calculating PBEs.
Some practically motivated work in this category is the work in [20] - [23] . Banerjee et al. in [20] - [22] studied the problem of social learning with sequentially acting selfish players who act exactly once in the game and make a decision to adopt or reject a trend based on their estimate of the system state. Players observe a private signal about the system state and publicly observe actions of past players. The authors analyze PBE of the 1 There are however instances where even though actions reveal private information, at equilibrium the signaling effect is nonexistent [12] , [13] , and [14, Sec. III.A]. Thus, MPE is an appropriate equilibrium concept for such games. In [12] , Doraszelski and Pakes extended the model of [8] where firms' set-up costs and scrap values are random and their private information. However, these are assumed to be i.i.d. across time and thus the knowledge of this private information in any period does not affect the future reward. In [13] and[14, Sec. III.A], Altman et al. discussed games with one-step delayed information pattern, where all players get access to players' private information with a delay one. In this case as well, signaling does not occur.
2 SPE and MPE are used for games where beliefs in the game are strategyindependent and consistent among players. Equivalently, these beliefs are derived from basic parameters of the problems and are not part of the definition of the equilibrium concept. dynamic game and study the convergent behavior of the system under an equilibrium, where they show occurrence of herding. Devanur et al. in [23] studied PBE of a repeated sales game where a single buyer has a valuation of a good, which is its private information, and a seller offers to sell a fresh copy of that good in every period through a posted price.
A. Contributions
In this paper, we present a sequential decomposition methodology for calculating a subset of all PBEs for finite and infinite horizon dynamic games with asymmetric information. Our model, consists of strategic players having types that evolve as conditionally independent Markov controlled processes. Players observe their types privately and actions taken by all players are observed publicly. Instantaneous reward for each player depends on everyone's types and actions. The proposed methodology provides a decomposition of the interdependence between beliefs and strategies in PBE and enables a systematic evaluation of a subset of PBE, namely structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (SPBE). Furthermore, we show that all SPBE can be computed using this methodology. Here, SPBE are defined as equilibria with players strategies based on their current private type and a set of beliefs on each player's current private type, which is common to all the players and whose domain is time invariant. The beliefs on players' types are such that they can be updated individually for each player and sequentially w.r.t. time. The model allows for signaling amongst players as beliefs depend on strategies.
Our motivation for considering SPBE stems from ideas in decentralized team problems and specifically the works of Ho [24] and Nayyar et al. [25] . We utilize the agent-by-agent approach in [24] to motivate a Markovian structure where players' strategies depend only on their current types. In addition, we utilize the common information-based approach introduced in [25] to summarize the common information into a common belief on players' private types. Even though these ideas motivate the special structure of our equilibrium strategies, they cannot be applied in games to evaluate SPBE because they have been developed for dynamic teams and are incompatible with equilibrium notions. Our main contribution is a new construction based on which SPBE can be systematically evaluated.
Specifically, for the finite horizon model, we provide a twostep algorithm involving a backward recursion followed by a forward recursion. The algorithm works as follows. In the backward recursion, for every time period, the algorithm finds an equilibrium generating function defined for all possible common beliefs at that time. This involves solving a one-step fixed point equation on the space of probability simplexes. Then, the equilibrium strategies and beliefs are obtained through a forward recursion using the equilibrium generating function obtained in the backward step and the Bayes update rule. The SPBE that are developed in this paper are analogous to MPEs (for games with symmetric information) in the sense that players choose their actions based on beliefs that depend on common information, and private types, both of which have Markovian dynamics.
For the infinite horizon model, instead of the backwards recursion step, the algorithm solves a single-shot time invariant fixed-point equation involving both an equilibrium generating function and an equilibrium reward-to-go function. We show that using our method, existence of SPBE in the asymmetric information dynamic game is guaranteed if the aforementioned fixed-point equation admits a solution. We provide suf-ficient conditions under which this is true. We demonstrate our methodology of finding SPBE through a multistage public goods game, whereby we observe the aforementioned signaling effect at equilibrium.
B. Relevant Literature
Related literature on this topic include [14] , [26] , and [27] . Nayyar et al. [14] , [26] considered dynamic games with asymmetric information. There is an underlying controlled Markov process and players jointly observe part of the process whilst making additional private observations. It is shown that the considered game with asymmetric information, under certain assumptions, can be transformed to another game with symmetric information. A backward recursive algorithm is provided to find MPE of the transformed game. For this strong equivalence to hold, Nayyar et al. [14] , [26] made a critical assumption in their model: based on the common information, a player's posterior beliefs about the system state and about other players' information are independent of the past strategies used by the players. This leads to all strategies being nonsignaling. Our model is different from this since as we assume that the underlying state of the system has independent components, each constituting a player's private type. However, we do not make any assumption regarding update of beliefs and allow the belief state to depend on players' past strategies, which in turn allows the possibility of signaling in the game.
Ouyang et al. [27] considered a dynamic oligopoly game with strategic sellers and buyers. Each seller privately observes the valuation of their good, which is assumed to have independent Markovian dynamics, thus resulting in a dynamic game of asymmetric information. The common belief is strategy dependent and the authors consider equilibria based on this common information belief. It is shown that if all other players play actions based on the common belief and their private information using equilibrium strategies, and if all players use equilibrium belief update function, then player i faces a Markov decision process (MDP) with respect to its action with state being the common belief and its private type. Thus, calculating equilibrium boils down to solving a fixed-point equation on belief update functions and strategies of all players. Existence of such equilibrium is shown for a degenerate case where players act myopically at equilibrium and the equilibrium itself is nonsignaling.
Other than the common information-based approach, Li and Shamma [28] considered a finite horizon zero-sum dynamic game, where at each time only one player out of the two knows the state of the system. The value of the game is calculated by formulating an appropriate linear program. Cole and Kocherlakota [29] considered an infinite horizon discounted reward dynamic game where actions are only privately observable. They provided a fixed-point equation for calculating a subset of sequential equilibrium, which is referred to as Markov private equilibrium (MPrE). In MPrE strategies depend on history only through the latest private observation.
C. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the model for games with finite and infinite horizon. Section III serves as motivation for focusing on SPBE. In Section IV, for finite-horizon games, we present a two-step backward-forward recursive algorithm to construct a strategy profile and a sequence of beliefs, and show that it is a PBE of the dynamic game considered. In Section V, we extend that methodology to infinite-horizon games. Section VII discusses concrete example of a public goods game with two players and results are presented for both, finite and infinite horizon versions of the example. Most proofs are provided in appendices with some exceptions, which are available in an extended version in [30] .
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system with N strategic players in the set N = {1, 2, . . . N}. We consider two cases: finite horizon T = {1, 2, . . . T } with perfect recall and infinite horizon with perfect recall. The system state is
i is the type of player i at time t, which is perfectly observed and is its private information. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent, controlled Markov processes such that
P (x t |x 1:t−1 , a 1: 
Let g = (g i ) i∈N be a strategy profile of all players. At the end of interval t, player i receives an instantaneous reward R i t (x t , a t ). To preserve the information structure of the problem, we assume that players do not observe their rewards until the end of game. 3 The reward functions and state transition kernels are common knowledge among the players. For the finite-horizon problem, the objective of player i is to maximize its total expected reward
For the infinite-horizon case, the transition kernels Q i t are considered to not depend on time t. We also substitute
is the common discount factor and R i is the time invariant stage reward function for player i. With all players being strategic, this problem is modeled as a dynamic game, D T for finite horizon and D ∞ for infinite horizon, with asymmetric information and simultaneous moves.
A. Preliminaries
Any history of this game at which players take action is of the form h t = (a 1:t−1 , x 1:t ). Let H t be the set of such histories, An appropriate concept of equilibrium for such games is PBE [5] , which consists of a pair (β * , μ * ) of strategy profile β * = (β * ,i t ) t∈T ,i∈N where β * ,i
where the reward-to-go is defined as
and the beliefs satisfy some consistency conditions as described in [5, p. 331] . Similarly, for the game
where the reward-to-go is
In general, a belief for player i at time t, i μ * t is defined on history h t = (a 1:t−1 , x 1:t ) given its private history h 
. Under the above structure, all consistency conditions that are required for PBEs [5, p. 331 ] are automatically satisfied.
III. MOTIVATION FOR STRUCTURED EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we present structural results for the considered dynamical process that serve as a motivation for finding SPBE of the underlying game D T . Specifically, we define a belief state based on common information history and show that any reward profile that can be obtained through a general strategy profile can also be obtained through strategies that depend on this belief state and players' current types, which are their private information. These structural results are inspired by the analysis of decentralized team problems, which serve as guiding principles to design our equilibrium strategies. While these structural results provide intuition and the required notation, they are not directly used in the proofs for finding SPBE later in Section IV.
At any time t, player i has information (a 1:t−1 , x i 1:t ) where a 1:t−1 is the common information among players, and x Then, in Lemma 2, we show that a 1:t−1 can be summarized through a belief π t , defined as follows. For any strategy profile 
. It should be noted that since π t is a function of random variables a 1:t−1 , m policy is a special type of s policy, which in turn is a special type of g policy.
Using the agent-by-agent approach [24] , we show in Lemma 1 that any expected reward profile of the players that can be achieved by any general strategy profile g can also be achieved by a strategy profile s.
Lemma 1: Given a fixed strategy g −i of all players other than player i and for any strategy g i of player i, there exists a strategy
which implies J i,s i g
Since any s i policy is also a g i type policy, the above lemma can be iterated over all players which implies that for any g policy profile there exists an s policy profile that achieves the same reward profile, i.e., (J i,s ) i∈N = (J i,g ) i∈N . Policies of types s still have increasing domain due to increasing common information a 1:t−1 . In order to summarize this information, we take an equivalent view of the system dynamics through a common agent, as taken in [31] . The common agent approach is a general approach that has been used extensively in dynamic team problems [32] - [35] . Using this approach, the problem can be equivalently described as follows: player i at time t observes a 1:t−1 and takes action γ i t , where
These actions are generated through some policy 
In the following lemma, we show that the space of profiles of type s is outcome-equivalent to the space of profiles of type m.
Lemma 2: For any given strategy profile s of all players, there exists a strategy profile m such that
The above two lemmas show that any reward profile that can be generated through a policy profile of type g can also be generated through a policy profile of type m. This is precisely the motivation for using SPBE which are equilibria based on policies of type m. It should be noted that the construction of . Thus, any unilateral deviation of player i in g policy profile does not necessarily translate to unilateral deviation of player i in the corresponding m policy profile. Therefore, g being an equilibrium of the game (in some appropriate notion) does not necessitate the corresponding m also being an equilibrium. Thus, the set of equilibria of type g contains those of type m but not vice-versa (in general); characterizing the relationship between the two sets of equilibria is an interesting open problem.
We end this section by noting that although finding general PBEs of type g of the games D T or D ∞ would be a desirable goal, since the space of strategies is growing exponentially with time, it would be computationally intractable. However, Lemmas 1 and 2 suggest that strategies of type m form a rich class that achieves every possible reward profile. Since these strategies are functions of beliefs π t that lie in a time-invariant space and are easily updatable, equilibria of this type are potential candidates for computation through backward recursion. Our goal is to devise an algorithm to find structured equilibria of type m of the dynamic games D T or D ∞ .
Definition 1 (SPBE):
A structured PBE is a PBE of the considered dynamic game where at any time t, for any agent i, its equilibrium strategy β * ,i t is of type m [as in (8b)].
IV. METHODOLOGY FOR SPBE COMPUTATION IN FINITE HORIZON
In this section, we consider the finite horizon dynamic game D T . In the previous section, (specifically in Lemma 3, included in the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix B), it is shown that due to the independence of types and their evolution as independent controlled Markov processes, for any strategy of the players, the joint common belief can be factorized as a product of its marginals, i.e., π t (
Since in this paper, we only deal with such joint beliefs, to accentuate this independence structure, we define π t ∈ × i∈N Δ(X i ) as vector of marginal beliefs where π t := (π i t ) i∈N . In the rest of the paper, we will use π t instead of π t whenever appropriate, where of course, π t can be constructed from π t . Similarly, we define the vector of belief updates as F (π, γ, a) := (F i (π i , γ i , a)) i∈N where (using Bayes rule)
The update function F i defined above depends on time t through the kernel Q i t (for the finite horizon model). For notational simplicity, we suppress this dependence on t. We also change the notation of policies of type m and θ as follows, so they depend on π t instead of π t
In the following, we present a backward-forward algorithm that evaluates SPBE. As will be shown in Theorem 2, this is a "canonical" methodology, in the sense that all SPBE can be generated this way.
A. Backward Recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θ i t ) i∈N ,t∈T , where
In addition, we define a sequence of reward-to-go functions of player i at time t, (V i t ) i∈N ,t∈{1,2,...T +1} , where
These quantities are generated through a backward recursive way, as follows.
1) Initialize ∀π
2 
where expectation in (13) is with respect to random variables (X
and F is defined above. Furthermore, using the quantityγ t found above, define
It should be noted that in (13) ,γ i t is not the outcome of a maximization operation as is the case in a best response equation of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Rather (13) is a different fixed point equation. This is because the maximizerγ i t appears in both, the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the equation (in the belief update
. This distinct construction is pivotal in the proof of Theorem 1, as will be further elaborated in the Discussion section.
B. Forward Recursion
As discussed above, a pair of strategy and belief profile (β * , μ * ) is a PBE if it satisfies (4). Based on θ defined above in (12) - (14), we now construct a set of strategies β * and beliefs μ * for the game D T in a forward recursive way, as follows. 5 As before, we will use the notation μ * t 
2) where F i is defined in (10) . We now state our main result. 4 The problem of existence in this step will be discussed in Section VI. 5 As discussed in the preliminaries section in Section II, the equilibrium beliefs in SPBE, μ * t are functions of each player's history h i t only through the common history h c t and are the same for all players.
Theorem 1: A strategy and belief profile (β * , μ * ), constructed through the backward-forward recursion algorithm is a PBE of the game, i.e., ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , a 1:
Proof: Please see Appendix C. We emphasize that even though the backward-forward algorithm presented above finds a class of equilibrium strategies that are structured, the unilateral deviations of players in (18) are considered in the space of general strategies, i.e., the algorithm does not make any bounded rationality assumptions.
The following result shows that the backward-forward construction described above is "canonical," in the sense that all SPBE can be found through this methodology. Clearly, an SPBE can be defined as a PBE (β * , μ * ) of the game that is generated through forward recursion in (15)- (17), using an equilibrium generating function φ, where φ = (φ Proof: Please see Appendix E.
C. Discussion
Several remarks are in order with regard to the above methodology and the result.
Remark 1: The second subcase in (10) dictates how beliefs are updated for histories with zero probability. The particular expression used is only one of many possible updates than can be used here. Dynamics that govern the evolution of public beliefs at histories with zero probability of occurrence affect equilibrium strategies. Thus, the construction proposed for calculating PBEs in this paper will produce a different set of equilibria if one changes the second subcase above. The most well-known example of another such update is the intuitive criterion proposed in [36] for Nash equilibria, later generalized to sequential equilibria in [37] . The intuitive criterion assigns zero probability to states that can be excluded based on data available to all players (in our case action profile history a 1:t−1 ). Another example of belief update is universal divinity, proposed in [38] .
Remark 2: To highlight the significance of the unique structure of (13) 
i.e., using the equilibrium strategies even for player i), then indeed the problem faced by user i is the MDP defined above. It is now clear why (13) has the flavor of a fixed-point equation: the update of beliefs needs to be fixed beforehand with the equilibrium actionγ i t even for user i, and only then user i's best response can depend only on the MDP state (X i t , Π t ), thus being a structured strategy as well. This implies that his/her optimal actionγ i t appears both on the left-and right-hand side of this equation giving rise to (13) .
Remark 3: In this paper, we find a class of PBEs of the game, while there may exist other equilibria that are not "structured," and cannot be found by directly using the proposed methodology. The rationale for using structured equilibria over others is the same as that for using MPE over SPE for a symmetric information game; a focusing argument for using simpler strategies being one of them.
V. METHODOLOGY FOR SPBE COMPUTATION IN INFINITE HORIZON
In this section, we consider the infinite horizon discounted reward dynamic game D ∞ . We state the fixed-point equation that defines the value function and strategy mapping for the infinite horizon problem. This is analogous to the backwards recursion [ (13) and (14)] that defines the value function and θ mapping for the finite horizon problem.
We define the set of functions
for given π) via the following fixed-point equation:
Note that the above is a joint fixed-point equation in (V,γ), unlike the backwards recursive algorithm earlier which required solving a fixed-point equation only inγ. Here, the unknown quantity is distributed as (
, and F i (·) is defined in (10) .
We define the belief μ * inductively similar to the forward recursion from Section IV-B. By construction, the belief defined above satisfies the consistency condition needed for a PBE. We denote the strategy arising out ofγ by β * , i.e.
Note that although the mapping θ i is stationary, the strategy β i, * t derived from it is not so. Below, we state the central result of this section that the strategy-belief pair (β * , μ * ) constructed from the solution of the fixed-point (20) and the forward recursion indeed constitutes a PBE.
Theorem 3: Assuming that the fixed-point (20) admits an absolutely bounded solution V i (for all i ∈ N ), the strategybelief pair (β * , μ * ) defined in (21) is a PBE of the infinite horizon discounted reward dynamic game, i.e.,
Proof: Please see Appendix F. Our approach to proving Theorem 3 is as follows. We begin by noting that the standard contraction mapping arguments used in infinite horizon discounted reward MDPs/POMDPs, viewed as a limit of finite horizon problems, do not apply here, since the policy (20a) is not a maximization, but a different fixed-point equation. So we attempt to "fit" the infinite horizon problem into the framework of finite-horizon model developed in the previous section. We do that by first introducing a terminal reward that depends on common beliefs, in the backward-forward recursion construction of Section IV for finite horizon games. We consider a finite horizon, T > 1, dynamic game with rewards same as in the infinite horizon version and time invariant transition kernels Q i . For each player i, there is a terminal reward G i (π T +1 , x i T +1 ) that depends on the terminal type of player i and the terminal belief. It is assumed that G i (·) is absolutely bounded. We define the value functions V i,T t 
VI. EXISTENCE RESULT FOR THE FIXED-POINT EQUATION
In this section, we discuss the problem of existence of signaling equilibria. 7 While it is known that for any finite dynamic 7 In the special case of uncontrolled types where player i's instantaneous reward does not depend on its private type x i t , the fixed point equation always has a type-independent, myopic solutionγ i t (·), since it degenerates to a bestresponse-like equation similar to the one for computing Nash equilibrium. This result is shown in [27] . game with asymmetric information and perfect recall, there always exists a PBE [4, Proposition 249.1], existence of SPBE is not guaranteed. It is clear from our algorithm that existence of SPBE boils down to existence of a solution to the fixed-point (13) in finite horizon and (20) in infinite horizon. Specifically, for the finite horizon, at each time t given the functions V i t+1 for all i ∈ N from the previous round (in the backwards recursion), (13) must have a solutionγ i t for all i ∈ N . Generally, existence of equilibria is shown through Kakutani's fixed point theorem, as is done in proving existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a finite game [4] , [39] . This is done by showing existence of fixed point of the best-response correspondences of the game. Among other conditions, it requires the "closed graph" property of the correspondences, which is usually implied by the continuity property of the utility functions involved. For (13), establishing existence is not straightforward due to: 1) potential discontinuity of the π t update function F when the denominator in the Bayesian update is 0 and 2) potential discontinuity of the value functions, V i t+1 . In the following, we provide sufficient conditions that can be checked at each time t to establish the existence of a solution.
We consider a generic fixed-point equation similar to the one encountered in Sections IV and V and state conditions under which they are guaranteed to have a solution. To concentrate on the essential aspects of the problem, we consider a simple case with N = 2, type sets 
, one wishes to solve the following system of equations for
where the expectation is evaluated using the probability distri-
The probabilistic policyγ can be represented by the 4-tuple
and three other similar equations forp 1L ,p 2H ,p 2L :
and in both definitions, if the denominator is 0, then the RHS is taken as π.
A. Points of Discontinuities and the Closed-Graph Result
Equation (25) and the other three similar equations are essentially of the form (for a given π)
4 as the set of discontinuity points of
is same as the sign of f i (x 0 ). In the following, we provide a sufficient condition for existence.
Theorem 4: Under Assumption (E1), there exists a solution to the fixed-point (27) .
Proof: Please see Appendix G. The above set of results provide us with an analytical tool for establishing existence of a solution to the concerned fixed-point equation.
While the above analytical result is useful in understanding a theoretical basis for existence, it does not cover all instances. For instance, fixed-point equation arising out of (13) for t = 1 from Section VII-A does not satisfy assumption (E1). In the following, we provide a more computationally orientated approach to establishing existence and/or solving the generic fixed-point (27) .
We motivate this case-by-case approach with the help of an example. Suppose we hypothesize that the solution to (27) is such that x = 0, w = 0 and y, z ∈ (0, 1). Then, (27) effectively reduces to checking if there exists y * , z * ∈ (0, 1) such that
Thus, the 4-variable system reduces to solving a 2-variable system and 2 conditions to verify. For instance, if f 2 (0, y, 0, z), f 4 (0, y, 0, z) as functions of y, z satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4, then the subsystem (28a) has a solution. If one of these solution is also consistent with (28b), then this subcase indeed provides a solution to (27) .
Generalizing the simplification provided in the above example, we divide solutions into 3 4 = 81 cases 8 based on whether each of x, y, w, z are in {0}, (0, 1), {1}. There are 1) 16 corner cases where none are in the strict interior (0, 1); 2) 32 cases where exactly one is in the strict interior (0, 1); 3) 24 cases where 2 variables are in the strict interior (0, 1); 4) 8 cases where 3 variables are in the strict interior (0, 1); and 5) 1 case where all 4 variables are in the strict interior (0, 1).
Similar to the calculations above, for each of the 81 cases, one can write a subsystem to which the problem (27) effectively reduces to. Clearly, if any one of the 81 subsystems has a solution then the problem (27) has a solution. Furthermore, searching for a solution reduces to an appropriate subproblem depending on the case.
The approach then is to enumerate each of these 81 cases (as stated above) and check them in order. However, this case-bycase division provides a computational simplification-not all cases require solving the entire fixed-point equation. Whenever a variable, say y, is not in the strict interior (0, 1), then the corresponding (27) need not be solved, since one only needs to verify the sign at a specific point. Hence, all subcases of (1) reduce to simply checking the value of functions f i at corner points-no need for solving a fixed-point equation. All subcases of (2) reduce to solving a 1-variable fixed-point equation and three corresponding conditions to verify.
VII. CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF MULTISTAGE INVESTMENT
IN PUBLIC GOODS Here, we discuss both a two-stage (finite) and an infinitehorizon version of a public goods example to illustrate the methodology described above for the construction of SPBE.
A. Two-Stage Public Goods Game
We consider a discrete version of [5, ch. 8, Example 8.3], which is an instance of a repeated public goods game. There are two players who play a two-period game. In each period t, they simultaneously decide whether to contribute to the period t public good, which is a binary decision a i t ∈ {0, 1} for players i = 1, 2. Before the start of period 2, both players know the action profile from period 1. In each period, each player gets a reward of 1 if at least one player contributed and 0 if none contributed. Player i's cost of contributing is x i which is its private information. Both players believe that x i 's are drawn independently and identically with probability distribution Q with support {x
). In our model, this corresponds to N = 2, T = 2 and reward for player i in period t is
. We set δ = 1 in this two-stage case. We use the backward recursive algorithm from Section IV to find an SPBE of this game. Here the partial functions γ i t can equivalently be defined through the scalars p 
Henceforth, p 
with intervals used whenever the solution is not uniquely defined. 
This implies (31) below, the solutions to which are shown in Fig. 1 in the space of (π
Thus, for any π 2 , there can exist multiple equilibria and correspondingly multiple θ 2 [π 2 ] can be defined. For any particular θ 2 , at t = 1, the fixed point equation arising out of (13) 
, where Q 2 = Q × Q denotes the profile of initial belief. Using one such θ 2 defined below, we find an SPBE of the game for q = 0.1, x L = 0.2, x H = 1.2. We use θ 2 [π 2 ] as one possible set of solutions of (31), described below:
Then, through iteration on the fixed point equation and using the aforementioned θ 2 
] is an SPBE of the game. In this equilibrium, player 2 at time t = 1, contributes according to his/her type whereas player 1 never contributes, thus player 2 reveals her private information through her action whereas player 1 does not. Since θ 2 is symmetric, there also exists an (antisymmetric) equilibrium where at time t = 1, players' strategies reverse, i.e., player 2 never contributes and player 1 contributes according to his/her type. We can also obtain a symmetric equilibrium where
.
B. Infinite horizon version
For the infinite horizon version, we consider three values δ = 0, 0.5, 0.95 and solve the corresponding fixed point equation [arising out of (20) . For δ = 0, the game is instantaneous and actually corresponds to the second round t = 2 play in the finite horizon two-stage version above. Thus, whenever player 1's type is x H , it is instantaneously profitable not to contribute. This givesp 1H = 0, for all π. Thus, we only plotp 1L , in Fig. 2 (this can be inferred from the discussion and Fig. 1 above) . Intuitively, with type x L , the only values of π for which player 1 would not wish to contribute is if he anticipates player 2's type to be x L with high probability and rely on player 2 to contribute. This is why for lower values of π 2 (i.e., player 2's type likely to be x L ), we seẽ p 1L = 0 in Fig. 2 . Now we considerp 1L plotted in Figs. 2 and 3. As δ increases, future rewards attain more priority and signaling comes into play. So while taking an action, players not only look for their instantaneous reward but also how their action affects the future public belief π about their private type. It is evident in the figures that as δ increases, at high π 1 , up to larger values of π 2 player 1 chooses not to contribute when his type is x L . This way he intends to send a "wrong" signal to player 2, i.e., that his/her type is x H and subsequently force player 2 to invest. This way player 1 can free-ride on player 2's investment.
Now we considerp
1H plotted in Fig. 3 . For δ = 0, we know that not contributing is profitable, however as δ increases from 0, players are mindful of future rewards and thus are willing to contribute at certain beliefs. Specifically, coordination via signaling is evident here. Although it is instantaneously not profitable to contribute if player 1's type is x H , by contributing at higher values of π 2 (i.e., player 2's type is likely x H ) and low π 1 , player 1 coordinates with player 2 to achieve net profit greater than 0 (reward when no one contributes). This is possible since the loss when contributing is −0.2, whereas the profit from free-riding on player 2's contribution is 1.
Under the equilibrium strategy, beliefs Π t form a Markov chain. One can trace this Markov chain to study the signaling effect at equilibrium. On numerically simulating this Markov chain for the above example (at δ = 0.95), we observe that for almost all initial beliefs, within a few rounds players completely learn each other's private type truthfully (or at least with very high probability). In other words, players manage to reveal their private type via their actions at equilibrium and to such an extent that it negates any possibly incorrect initial belief about their type. A measure of cooperative coordination at equilibrium can also be ascertained by comparing the per-round normalized value function
with the best possible attainable single-round reward under a symmetric mixed strategy under 1) full coordination and 2) no coordination, neither of which may be equilibrium themselves. The calculations for this (please see [30] for details) show that players at equilibrium end up achieving reward close to the best possible (full coordination) and gain significantly compared to the strategy of no coordination.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a methodology for evaluating SPBE for games with asymmetric information and independent private types evolving as controlled Markov processes. The main contribution is a time decomposition akin to dynamic programing. This decomposition allows one to find SPBE that exhibit signaling behavior with linear complexity in the time horizon. Using this methodology, dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information are studied in [40] where it is shown that under certain conditions, there exists an SPBE of the game with strategies being linear in players' private types. In [41] , Vasal and Anastasopoulos extended the finite-horizon model in this paper such that players do not observe their own types, rather make independent noisy observations of their types. An analogous backward-forward algorithm is presented for that model. It is worth noting that although structured strategies are useful in making the equilibrium finding process tractable, no claim can be made about whether the resulting equilibrium outcomes are better or worse than those corresponding to general strategies. We believe this is an interesting future research direction. Another interesting future direction is dynamic mechanism design for asymmetric information systems.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The whole proof is presented in [30] which involves the following steps.
1) We first show that for any policy profile g and ∀t ∈ T , x i 1:t for i ∈ N are conditionally independent given the common information a 1:t . = F (π t , γ t , a 1 ) where F i and F are appropriately defined from above.
We now proceed with the proof of Lemma 2. The whole proof is presented in [30] and involves the following steps.
We view this problem from the perspective of a common agent.
1) In Lemma 3, we showed that π t can be factorized.
2) We prove that (Π t , Γ t ) t∈T is a controlled Markov process.
3) We construct a policy profile θ from s such that θ t (dγ t | π t ) = P ψ (dγ t |π t ). 4) We prove that the payoff-relevant marginal distributions of this Markov process, (Π t , Γ t ) t∈T , under θ are the same as under ψ, i.e., P θ (dπ t , dγ t , dπ t+1 ) = P ψ (dπ t , dγ t , dπ t+1 ). 5) We prove that with respect to random variables (X t , A t ), π t can summarize common information a 1:t−1 , i.e., P ψ (x t , a t |a 1:t−1 , γ t ) = P (x t , a t |π t , γ t ). 6) From 3), 4), and 5), we then prove the result of the lemma that P ψ (x t , a t ) = P θ (x t , a t ) which is equivalent to P s (x t , a t ) = P m (x t , a t ), where m is the policy profile of players corresponding to θ.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: We prove (18) 
